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Abstract
We examine whether investors’ biased ex-ante beliefs regarding the probability dis-
tribution of future events’ outcomes can partially explain the stock market’s ineﬃcient
response to resolution of uncertainty. In our experiment, we analyze stock returns of
publicly traded European soccer clubs around important matches. Using a novel proxy
for investors’ expectations derived from contracts traded on betting exchanges (pre-
diction markets), we find that in our sample investor sentiment is attributable in part
to a systematic bias in investors’ ex-ante expectations. Investors are overly optimistic
about their teams’ prospects ex-ante and, on average, end up disappointed ex-post,
leading to negative post-event abnormal returns. Our evidence may have important
implications for firms’ investment decisions and corporate control transactions.
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1 Introduction
What is investor sentiment? Defined very broadly, investor sentiment is present whenever
security prices deviate from present values of future cash flows. There are two potential
reasons for such deviations. First, investors may incorporate considerations that are due
to irrational reactions or emotions while evaluating securities (see Hirshleifer (2001) for an
excellent overview of psychological biases). Second, investors may have biased estimates
of the distributions of firms’ future cash flows (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007)).
While the first type of investor sentiment has received substantial attention (e.g., Saunders
(1993), Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003), Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2000, 2003), Frieder
and Subrahmanyam (2004), and Yuan, Zheng and Zhu (2005)), the eﬀects of ex-ante biased
beliefs on firm value has received relatively little attention, which may be due to the inherent
diﬃculty of measuring investors’ subjective expectations.
To examine whether investors’ inability to correctly estimate probability distributions
of event outcomes aﬀects market prices, we focus on the stock price behavior of publicly
traded sports clubs. This experimental design is desirable for at least two reasons. First,
frequent, easily quantifiable, and value-relevant information signals have observable ex-ante
(objective) expectations (e.g., Brown and Hartzell (2001)). Second, if investors occasionally
react irrationally to resolution of uncertainty, sporting events would be an ideal setting for
detecting such emotional reactions (e.g., Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2007)). Our tests rely
on a novel proxy for investors’ subjective beliefs and, diﬀerent from earlier studies, show
that sentiment is at least partially an ex-ante phenomenon, in the sense that investors are
overly optimistic ex-ante and, thus, typically end up disappointed ex-post.
The distinction between the two manifestations of investor sentiment is important.
Consider, for instance, firms’ earnings announcements. Skinner and Sloan (2002) and
Trueman, Wong and Zhang (2003) find that stock prices of growth firms, and of internet
firms in particular, respond asymmetrically to earnings surprises. Specifically, average
realized negative returns following negative surprises are significantly larger in magnitude
than typical positive returns following positive surprises, a result that is not due to a
more frequent occurrence of positive surprises. This evidence could be consistent with
both types of investor sentiment. On the one hand, investors may be overly optimistic
ex-ante, resulting in average negative returns following earnings announcements. On the
other hand, even if investors have unbiased ex-ante beliefs about earnings realizations, their
1
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irrational ex-post reaction to earnings surprises may not be eﬃciently priced in before the
announcements.
Notably, however, an asymmetric market response to earnings announcements could
also occur in a world in which prices are eﬃcient, both ex-ante and ex-post. Indeed, there
is evidence that firms manage earnings to meet target thresholds (e.g. Degeorge, Patel,
and Zeckhauser, 1999) and that market prices react sharply to even small negative earnings
surprises. The possibility of firms purposely manipulating reported event outcomes may
contaminate analyses of the sources of investor sentiment that are based on self-reported
corporate events. Therefore, another major benefit of our experiment is that match out-
comes are verifiable and irreversible, all but eliminating concerns that the market reaction
to the resolution of uncertainty may be partially driven by investors’ perception of potential
manipulation.
Our study is related to the seminal work of Brown and Hartzell (2001), as well as studies
by Palomino, Renneboog and Zhang (2005) and Renneboog and Van Brabant (2000) in
that we analyze stock returns of sports franchises. We document a close-to-zero mean
positive return following wins and significant mean negative returns after losses and draws.
Importantly, similar to Brown and Hartzell (2001) and Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2007),
we find that the unconditional mean post-event return is negative. The market reaction to
game outcomes is clearly asymmetric: stock price changes following losses are substantially
larger in magnitude than those following wins.
Brown and Hartzell (2001) and Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2007) suggest that the
market’s asymmetric reaction to match outcomes may be due to investors’ optimism.1
Yet, existing studies find no support for this conjecture (e.g., Brown and Hartzell (2001),
Palomino, Renneboog and Zhang (2005), and Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2007)). These
studies use winning and losing odds quoted by bookmakers as a proxy for investors’ beliefs
regarding game outcomes. However, there are reasons to believe that investors’ expecta-
tions may not be well represented by odds quoted by bookmakers. First, bookmaker odds
1As Edmans, Garcia, and Norli (2007; p. 1991) explain: “. . . the reference point against which gains
and losses are measured becomes an important determinant of utility. The natural reference point in our
setting is that of supporters’ pre-game expectations of how their team will perform. A number of studies
show that fans are subject to an “allegiance bias,” whereby individuals who are psychologically invested
in a desired outcome generate biased predictions... Thus, if the reference point of soccer fans is that their
team will win, we may find a greater stock price reaction after losses than after wins.”
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are generally found to be eﬃcient predictors of game results (e.g., Sauer (1998)).2 More-
over, bookmakers are reportedly more skilled at predicting game outcomes than bettors
and, thus, quote odds that deviate systematically from bettors’ expectations (e.g., Levitt
(2004)). Finally, investors appear to ignore the periodic release of bookmaker odds (e.g.,
Palomino, Renneboog and Zhang (2005)). Therefore, it is not clear to what extent book-
maker odds, compiled by a small group of experts, reflect investors’ subjective beliefs.
We argue that a better — albeit far from perfect — measure of investors’ subjective
expectations of game outcomes may be derived from the market price of related contracts
traded on betting exchanges (prediction markets). To the best of our knowledge, this
measure has not been used before.3 The crucial diﬀerence between prices set in a betting
exchange and bookmaker odds is that the former are determined by investors’ demand
for and supply of underlying contracts, whereas bookmakers post odds and take sides in
each transaction. Thus, the odds quoted by bookmakers represent the expectations of
“bet compilers” and do not necessarily correspond to the subjective beliefs of investors in
soccer clubs’ stocks. We argue that equilibrium prices of contracts traded in prediction
markets are better aligned with investors’ beliefs.4 Importantly, since the betting exchange
contracts that we use are very short-lived — most of them are matched on game-day — the
risk-neutral probabilities of game outcomes implied by these contracts’ prices should be
nearly identical to physical probabilities of outcomes perceived by investors. Thus, one can
use betting exchange prices to make inferences about investors’ subjective beliefs.
Our results show that distinguishing between the probability distribution of match out-
comes implied by bookmaker odds (objective probabilities hereafter) and that implied by
betting exchange prices (subjective probabilities henceforth) is crucial in the analysis of
investor sentiment. Based on tests employing bookmaker odds, we can reject the hypoth-
esis that pre-event stock prices reflect expected post-game prices. Conversely, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that pre-game stock prices equal expected post-game prices computed
2We discuss the eﬃciency of bookmaker odds in predicting game results in Section 6.
3See Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2003) for a discussion of betting exchanges or “prediction markets”. See
Arrow et al. (2007) for a statement that encourages U.S. regulators to lower the barriers to creating new
prediction markets, arguing that they provide superior forecasting tools.
4While we expect prices of contracts trading on betting exchanges to be a better proxy for investors’
beliefs, this proxy has its limitations, which have implications for the interpretation of our results. These
limitations are discussed in detail in Section 6.
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using investors’ subjective (biased) probabilities of game outcomes - as implied by betting
exchange prices. This finding is consistent with the idea that the apparent market inef-
ficiency follows to some extent from investors’ inability to assign correct probabilities to
event outcomes.
This result is important because many important decisions taken by publicly traded
firms are based in part on presumably eﬃcient market values. Examples include real in-
vestments (e.g., Tobin (1969) and Hayashi (1982)), timing of mergers and acquisitions (e.g.,
Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) and Lyandres, Zhdanov and Hsieh (2008)), and corporate
control decisions in general (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986)).5 Thus, understanding the
evolution of stock prices around resolutions of uncertainty is crucial for firm value maxi-
mization.
Our analysis of betting exchange prices also contributes to the literature examining
the eﬃciency of betting markets (e.g., Golec and Tamarkin (1991), Gray and Gray (1997),
Palomino, Renneboog and Zhang (2005), Sauer, Brajer, Ferris and Marr (1988), Vlastakis,
Dotsis and Markellos (2006), and Zuber, Gandar and Bowers (1985) among many others).
Consistent with anecdotal evidence, our empirical tests show that there are systematic
diﬀerences between betting exchange prices and bookmaker odds. In particular, unlike
bookmaker odds, betting exchange prices often reflect an overly optimistic assessment of
public teams’ prospects. For instance, teams playing away from home are overvalued on
betting exchanges, as the in-sample proportion of wins by away teams is significantly lower
than the prices of the corresponding contracts would imply, whereas no such bias is evident
in bookmaker odds.
To summarize, the main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we introduce a
novel proxy for investors’ beliefs about likelihoods of future event outcomes in order to
examine the eﬀects of biased investors’ ex-ante expectations on the market’s reaction to
resolution of uncertainty. We argue that betting exchange prices are more closely related
to investors’ subjective expectations than bookmaker odds. Second, we show that an
important reason for the stock market’s apparent ineﬃcient response to soccer game results
is the systematic bias in investors’ beliefs about the probability distribution of match
5 Ineﬃcient market values can also aﬀect corporate decisions, such as overvaluation-driven acquisisions
in Shleifer and Vishny (2003).
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outcomes. While due to the nature of our proxy for investors’ subjective beliefs, the scope
of this study is limited to stocks of publicly traded sport franchises, a similar reasoning
may be useful in other settings involving investors’ ineﬃcient responses to uncertainty
resolutions.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide an illustrative example
of how the two sources of investor sentiment may aﬀect securities prices. In Section 3 we
describe the data and present summary statistics. Section 4 shows that sports performance
and operating performance are related and, thus, game results may provide investors with
important information about clubs’ valuation. In Section 5 we examine the evolution
of stock prices around games. We discuss our proxies for investors’ subjective beliefs
and objective probabilities of game outcomes, and various biases associated with them
in Section 6. In Section 7 we incorporate investors’ pre-game expectations into tests of
post-game returns. We summarize our evidence and conclude in Section 8.
2 An illustrative example of ex-ante biased beliefs and ex-
post emotional reactions
As mentioned above, Skinner and Sloan (2002) and Trueman, Wong and Zhang (2003) show
that average realized negative returns following negative earnings surprises are significantly
larger in magnitude than the typical positive returns following positive surprises, resulting
in overall negative average market reaction to earnings announcements. In addition to
potential earnings management, this finding could be due to investors’ overly optimistic
expectations of firms’ earnings or investors’ ex-post irrational reaction to resolutions of
uncertainty. Carrying on an example based on this empirical finding, in this section we
illustrate how the two alternative, non-mutually-exclusive sources of investor sentiment
may aﬀect stock prices around earnings announcements.
The diﬀerence between the two forms of investor sentiment are illustrated in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here
Assume that a firm faces an event with an uncertain outcome. For simplicity, assume
there are two possible realizations of post-event value, 1 and 1 , which occur with
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probabilities  and 1 −  respectively, where 1  1 . Figure 1a depicts the base-
case scenario in which investors have unbiased expectations and respond rationally to
uncertainty resolutions. In this case, firm’s pre-event value, 0, equals expected post-event
value, E(1) = 1 +(1−)1 . Assume now that investors are overly optimistic, in the
sense that they believe that the probability of the good outcome, 1 , is   . In that
case, depicted in Figure 1b, 0 = E(1)  E(1), i.e. pre-event value, which equals the
expectation of post-event value under investors’ subjective probability distribution, E, is
higher than expected post-event value under the true probability distribution. As a result,
the expected change in value around the event is negative.
Now consider a third scenario, depicted in Figure 1c, in which investors assign correct
probabilities to event outcomes but react emotionally to the resolution of uncertainty, i.e.
their post-event valuations,  01 and  01 are diﬀerent from true post-event values, 1 and
1 , these diﬀerences not being reflected in pre-event value, 0. (In the particular case
depicted in Figure 1c, investors overreact to both good and bad outcomes, but more so to
the bad one). Note that similar to the case presented in Figure 1b, the expected change in
value around the event can be negative.
Under the scenario depicted in Figure 1b, referred to as “immediate emotions” (see
Loewenstein (2000)), firms’ post-announcement market values are eﬃcient, while pre-
announcement values are ineﬃcient. Under the scenario shown in Figure 1c, referred to as
“anticipated emotions”, pre-event values are eﬃcient, while post-event ones are not.
3 Data and summary statistics
Our sample consists of all Champions League and UEFA Cup games (including qualify-
ing rounds) played during the period 1/2000 - 5/2006 and featuring at least one publicly
traded club at the time of the match. Overall, there are 20 publicly traded teams from eight
countries that have participated in at least one game in either the Champions League or
the UEFA Cup during this period, ranging from such powerhouses as Manchester United,
Juventus and Ajax, to virtually unknown teams such as Danish clubs Aalborg and Silke-
borg.6 Our sample teams played in 595 unique matches, 31 of which featured two publicly
traded clubs, corresponding to 626 observations.
6Since we examine only teams that have played at least one game in one of the European competitions
during the sample period, our sample includes only a subset of all publicly traded clubs. In addition, not
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We choose to concentrate on international games, rather than national championships
or cups, for several reasons. First, we hypothesize and show empirically that games in
European competitions are very important for clubs’ profitability and valuation. Second,
the UEFA Cup and the Champions League are structured as knock-out rounds of pairs
of games, for the most part. Hence, a team plays its opponent in a given round twice
(home and away), and advances or is eliminated based on the combined outcome of the
two games, which are usually scheduled two weeks apart. Because a team’s advancement to
the next round typically depends solely on its own performance, the team’s post-game stock
return does not depend (indirectly) on the outcome of games played by other clubs, unlike
in the case of national championships. (Such inter-game dependence would contaminate
tests of the relation between game results and stock returns.)7 Third, as discussed in the
introduction, we use bookmaker odds and prices of contracts traded on betting exchanges
to assess objective probabilities of game outcomes and investors’ subjective beliefs. These
data are not available for some of the national leagues and cups for most of our sample
period. Finally, while national leagues’ games generally take place during the weekend
posing a potential weekend-eﬀect problem, UEFA Cup and Champions League games are
played between Tuesdays and Thursdays.8
We obtain game results along with match dates from the Rec.Sport.Soccer Statistics
Foundation at www.rsssf.com. We cross-check the results and dates against those reported
by Betexplorer, which is the source of bookmaker odds data (www.betexplorer.com; we
discuss the data obtained from this source in detail below). Table 1 presents summary
statistics for various game and club characteristics. Panel A reports statistics separately
for the 20 teams, Panel B aggregates them by country, and Panel C reports averages for
all teams in our sample have been publicly traded throughout the whole sample period. The four Turkish
teams went public from 2002 (Bes¸iktas¸) through 2004 (Fenerbahçe) to 2005 (Galatasaray and Trabzonspor),
Juventus went public in 2001, and Roma and Borussia Dortmund became public in 2000. The most valuable
sports franchise in the world, Manchester United, was sold to a private investor and delisted in 2006.
7There are some exceptions to the knock-out system. Part of the games in the Champions League are
played within four-team group stages, and one of the rounds in the UEFA Cup was structured as a five-team
group stage during part of our sample period. All of the results reported below are robust to excluding
group-stage matches from the sample.
8National cups’ games are played on weekdays. Cup games, however: have arguably small economic
consequences; are most important for the smaller teams, which are uncommon in our sample of publicly
traded clubs; and suﬀer from the data limitation explained above.
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the whole sample.
Insert Table 1 here
The first column in Panel A (B) of Table 6 contains team (country) names in alphabetical
order. Successful, established teams tend to play many European matches — over 70 each
for Manchester United and Porto, whereas smaller clubs tend to be featured in a handful
of games only, as shown in the third column. Large soccer nations — England, Italy, and
Portugal — comprise more than 60% of the sample.
The next two columns report the number of games each team played against other
publicly traded opponents and the number of elimination games, defined as either the
second game of a knock-out stage or the last game of a group stage. About two thirds of
the games in our sample are played in the Champions League competition, as shown in the
sixth column. The next column presents the number of games played in advanced stages
of European competitions.9 About half of the 169 games in advanced stages were played
by Manchester United, Juventus, and Porto. The number of home games is presented in
the eighth column. Half of the games in our sample are played on public teams’ home turf.
The next column contains the number of games in which a team is considered to be
the favorite. We characterize as favorite in a given match the team with the higher of-
ficial UEFA rating prior to the game. Team ratings are available from www.xs4all.nl/
~kassiesa/bert/uefa/data. A club’s rating depends on two additive terms: its own per-
formance in European competitions during prior five years, as well as the performance of
all teams playing in the club’s national league. Thus, if a team has not qualified for a
European competition for five consecutive years, its rating equals its country’s rating.10
The next six columns report the proportions of various game outcomes and the average
number of goals scored and received per match. Public teams in our sample won about
42% and lost 33% of their games, tying the remaining ones. This winning record is not
9We define quarterfinals, semifinals and finals of the Champions League and the UEFA Cup, as well as
the second group stage of the Champions League as advanced stages.
10This approach has an advantage over defining favorites/underdogs based on bookmakers’ odds (spreads)
as in the existing betting literature (e.g., Golec and Tamarkin (1991) and Gray and Gray (1997)). Betting
odds depend both on the intrinsic quality of a team and its opponent, and on whether a game is played
at home or away. Thus, betting odds tend to be highly correlated with the home/away variable, while our
definition of favorites/underdogs is orthogonal to the home/away variable.
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overly surprising, given that most of the public teams feature better squads than their
typical opponents, at least in the early stages of the competitions. Consequently, teams in
our sample advance to subsequent rounds in 55% of the elimination games. Naturally, our
sample clubs score on average more goals than their opponents. The next three columns
present the number of games in which betting exchange data, bookmaker odds data, and
both are available. Betting exchange prices are available for about one third of the sample.
The four rightmost columns in Table 1 report soccer clubs’ book and market values and
operating performance measures. Market values and accounting variables are obtained from
Datastream. All values are converted into U.S. dollars using contemporaneous exchange
rates available from Datastream. For each game by each club, we compute the market
value of equity as the product of the number of shares outstanding and the stock price one
day prior to the team’s game. The table reports pre-game market capitalizations averaged
across all games played during the sample period. There is a tremendous variation in soccer
clubs’ equity values. They range from less than a million dollars for Silkeborg to almost a
billion dollars for Manchester United. Similar variation is observed in the clubs’ average
annual sales and book assets.11 Finally, the last column in the table reports firms’ average
annual return-on-assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of EBITDA to lagged book assets. All
clubs except for Millwall are profitable on average, with the typical ROA exceeding 15%.
4 Do sports results matter?
The analysis of the market’s reaction to game results hinges on the assumption that the
latter aﬀect clubs’ valuations by influencing their operating performance (e.g., by allow-
ing them to play in additional lucrative games, increasing the compensation from UEFA
for participation in its tournaments, raising merchandise sales, advertising revenues, and
proceeds from TV rights). Thus, before analyzing stock returns following games, we ex-
amine the relation between teams’ success in European competitions and their operating
performance.
Each year we compute four measures of clubs’ sports performance. The first one is the
number of games played in the European competitions during the year. Due to the knock-
11Accounting variables are not available from Datastream for all four Turkish clubs and for Sporting
Lisbon.
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out nature of the Champions League and the UEFA Cup, the number of games is highly
correlated with performance: more games indicate advancement through more rounds. A
similar measure of sports performance is a dummy variable equalling one if the team has
reached an advanced stage of one of the two competitions, as defined above, and equalling
zero otherwise. Our third measure of performance is a dummy variable equalling one if
the club has played at least one game in the Champions League during the year because
participation in this competition is more lucrative and, thus, expected to have a larger
positive impact on teams’ fortunes. The fourth measure is the team’s UEFA rating.
Armed with these measures of franchises’ sports success, we then estimate the following
club-year regression:
 = +  +  (1)
where  is club ’s ratio of EBITDA in year  to book assets in year  − 1 and
 is one of the four performance measures above. The regression is estimated using
club fixed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered by firm, as in Petersen (2008).12 The
results are presented in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 here
Profitability is clearly related to sports performance. The coeﬃcients on all performance
measures are significantly positive at the 5% level. More importantly the economic impact
of a club’s successful performance in European competitions on profitability is large. The
coeﬃcient estimates suggest that each game played in the Champions League or the UEFA
Cup increases EBITDA by about 0.6 percentage points. Reaching an advanced stage of
one of the competitions is associated with a 7.7 percentage points increase in profitability,
and participating in the Champions League increases EBITDA by 9.2 percentage points.
These eﬀects are by no means trivial relative to the typical ROA of 15.3% reported in
Table 1.
The positive relation between a club’s sports performance and its operating performance
is reassuring. It is also consistent with the analysis of Brown and Hartzell (2001), who find
that the operating performance of North-American professional basketball, baseball and
football franchises is directly related to the teams’ sports performance. Nonetheless, the
12The four measures of performance are not used simultaneously due to multicollinearity. Correlations
among the performance measures range between 48% and 72%.
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association between sports and operating performance does not necessarily imply that game
results provide information to investors that is important enough to trade on. To begin
our analysis of this question, we compare the trading volume on days following games and
on game days to the typical oﬀ-game trading volume.
We obtain daily number of shares traded for each club from Datastream and define
abnormal trading volume,  , as
  = ln
µ  
 −5
¶
 (2)
where   is the trading volume on game days or days following games, and
 −5 is the trading volume five trading days earlier. We normalize the volume
on days around games by one-trading-week lagged volume because European games are
generally played on weekdays at most once a fortnight and national games are typically
played on weekends. Thus, in the vast majority of cases,  − 5 is an oﬀ-game day. Fur-
thermore, comparing   with  −5 eliminates the possible day of the
week eﬀect. On rare occasions when two games are scheduled one week apart — this hap-
pens sometimes in early qualifying rounds and group stages — we use  +5 or
 −10 instead of  −5. Mean abnormal trading volumes around game
days are presented in Table 3.
Insert Table 3 here
The trading volume of soccer clubs’ stocks appears to be abnormally high on game days
as well as on days following games. The mean volume on game days is 25% higher than on
oﬀ-game days and the mean volume on days following games is 39% higher than the oﬀ-
game-day volume, both diﬀerences being highly significant. Abnormal trading volume on
days following games is large and significant following wins and losses, but less so following
draws, consistent with draws being less informative about a team’s chances to advance
to the next round of the competition. Interestingly, abnormal volume is much higher
following elimination games than following non-elimination games (70% higher than oﬀ-
game volume and 30% higher than oﬀ-game volume respectively) and, in the former subset,
volume following eliminations is typically larger than following advances, consistent with
eliminations providing more information than advances to next rounds.
These results are consistent with the evidence in Brown and Hartzell (2001), who report
that the trading volume of Boston Celtics Partnership shares increases following games.
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Thus, similar to professional basketball, soccer games provide new information on which
investors trade. Notably, however, the trading volume is also abnormally high during game
days, but only when the eventual outcome is not a draw. Similarly, abnormal volume is
larger during game-days in which the eventual result is elimination than when a team ends
up advancing to the next round. In the next section we examine the magnitudes of the
market’s responses to new information contained in game outcomes and relate the results
on game-day and next-day trading volumes to stock returns.
5 Game outcomes and returns
A soccer club’s profitability and value is related to its sports performance (see Table 2).
Furthermore, investors seem to trade on the information conveyed by games’ outcome (see
Table 3). Therefore, we expect soccer clubs’ stock prices to react favorably to wins and
negatively to losses. In this section we investigate whether this is indeed the case. Although
we focus our analysis on stock returns following games, we also document some interesting
patterns in game-day returns, which we discuss at the end of this section.
5.1 Returns on days following games
We compute abnormal returns following games13 by estimating the market model for each
club each year:
∈ =  + 1 + 2−1 + 3−1 +  (3)
where ∈ is the daily return on stock  on day  belonging to year  ,  (−1)
is the value-weighted (lagged) local market index return, −1 is stock ’s previous-day
return, and  is the resulting estimate of daily abnormal return.14 We estimate the market
model on an annual basis because we conjecture and confirm empirically that the intercept
in (3) is not constant over time. Many clubs in our sample became public either during
the sample period or not long before its start. The literature on the underperformance of
recent new issuers (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Ritter (1991)), shows that the
performance of newly issued stocks in years following their Initial Public Oﬀerings is not
13All the results below hold for raw returns.
14We include lagged market returns to account for the fact that some soccer clubs’ shares are thinly
traded. Lagged individual stock returns are included to account for possible autocorrelations.
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stable.15 Table 4 reports post-game abnormal returns when the sample is partitioned into
wins, losses, and draws.16
Insert Table 4 here
We start the analysis by examining the returns for the whole sample. Importantly, wins
result in statistically insignificant average abnormal returns of 0.15%, while losses and
draws generate highly significant average returns of -2.2% and -0.9% respectively. The
diﬀerences between the market reaction to wins, losses, and draws, reported in columns 4
and 5, are statistically significant and economically large.
We further segment the sample by home and away games. Home teams win more
frequently than away teams: 173 wins and 64 losses for home teams compared with 93 wins
and 145 losses for away teams. Consistent with this finding, the mean return following home
wins is close to zero and statistically insignificant, while the one following away wins is a
marginally significant 0.6%. For the same reason, losses on home turf have a larger impact
than losses away from home, -3% versus -1.8%. Next, we separate pre-game favorites from
underdogs. The distinction based on pre-game ratings tends to be borne out on the field:
favorites (underdogs) win (lose) approximately twice as many games as they lose (win).
Thus, similar to the evidence on home/away games, the market is not overly surprised when
favorites win - the mean return is close to zero and insignificant, whereas wins by underdogs
convey important positive information - the mean abnormal return is a significant 1.1%.
Losses by underdogs are greeted less unfavorably than losses by favorites (mean returns of
-1.6% for underdogs and -2.7% for favorites).
Next, we separate the sample by stage of the competition, into early and advanced.
Consistent with games at later stages having larger value consequences, we find that the
magnitude of returns after both wins and losses is larger after games in advanced stages
than in early ones. Finally, we restrict our attention to elimination games and focus on
whether a team advances to the next round or is eliminated, rather than on the result of the
game per se. Returns following advances to the next round are positive and significant and
15Estimating abnormal returns for the entire sample period as in Brown and Hartzell (2001) provides
results that are qualitatively similar to those reported.
16The significance of abnormal returns in Table 4 is assessed using the cross-sectional test (e.g., Boehmer,
Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) and Brown and Warner (1985)), in which the t-statistic is computed as the
mean return divided by its cross-sectional standard deviation.
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are higher than returns following wins. Returns following eliminations are slightly larger
in magnitude than returns following losses. Because the results for wins/draws/losses
and advances/eliminations are by no means independent, however, these diﬀerences likely
underestimate the impact of advances to the next round and of eliminations.
Large stock price changes following losses relative to post-win returns are not suﬃcient
to conclude that the stock market’s reaction to game outcomes is ineﬃcient. This finding
could well be consistent with investors’ rational ex-ante beliefs. To claim that the market’s
reaction to game results is ineﬃcient, it is necessary that the mean return around matches
be significantly diﬀerent from zero. The last column of Table 4 reports the average post-
game return for the whole sample, as well as for various subsamples. Importantly, the mean
post-game return is negative and highly significant across all subsamples, and is largest in
magnitude for games played in advanced stages of European competitions. This finding is
clearly a challenge for market eﬃciency. We examine it closely in the next section.
Overall, the evidence in Table 4 supports the notion that the outcome of games has an
immediate impact on club values. To further examine the eﬀect of game outcomes on stock
returns, we complement the univariate analysis by estimating a multivariate regression of
post-game returns on indicator variables for wins and losses and their interactions with
clubs’ and games’ observed characteristics:
 = +  +  +
X

_ +
X

_ +  (4)
where  equals one if public team  has won game  and zero otherwise,  is the lost
game indicator,  are three dummy variables,  = 1 2 3, that equal one if team  played
game  at home, if team  was the favorite for the game, and if game  is in an advanced
stage of the European competitions respectively. To interpret the intercept of (4) as the
mean return following draws, we normalize  to have zero means.17 Table 5 presents
the results of estimating (4).
Insert Table 5 here
Column 1 of Table 5 confirms the results in Table 4: relatively neutral outcomes — draws
— are followed by significantly negative returns, returns following wins are significantly
17For example, since half of the games played by public teams’ are on home turf, the home indicator
variable takes a value of 05 for home games and −05 for away games.
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higher than those following draws, and losses are accompanied by negative returns that are
significantly larger in magnitude than post-draw returns. This asymmetric return pattern,
manifested by negative returns following draws, near-neutral reactions to wins, and large
negative returns after losses, is consistent with the findings of Brown and Hartzell (2001)
and Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2007).
The results reported in column 2 show that home losses are associated with larger
negative returns than away losses, which are more likely ex-ante, the diﬀerence being highly
significant. Wins by favorites, which are also expected, result in significantly lower post-
game returns than wins by underdogs, which occur much more rarely. Finally, both wins
and losses in advanced stages of the competitions result in returns of larger magnitudes,
although only losses in advanced stages have a significantly larger impact on returns.
5.2 Game-day returns
Table 6 presents returns on game days. Its layout is the same as that of Table 4.
Insert Table 6 here
As evident from the last column of Table 6, the mean return on game day is positive, 0.5%,
and highly statistically significant. Furthermore, the mean game-day return is positive
and significant in all subsamples except for the sample of teams that are underdogs ex-
ante. There are two potential non-mutually-exclusive explanations for non-zero game-day
returns. First, some information related to the eventual match outcome may become
available before the game itself (i.e. coaches releasing information about starting lineups
and players’ injuries; teams’ preparedness to games gradually becoming public knowledge).
It is not obvious, however, why positive news would be released consistently more frequently
on game-days than negative news. Therefore, the information hypothesis may not fully
explain the documented positive game-day returns.
Second, as argued in Trueman, Wong and Zhang (2003) and Liang (1999), investor
optimism could generate price pressure as a result of large demand for the clubs’ stocks
in anticipation of uncertainty-resolving events. This price pressure explanation may be
sensible in our setting given that soccer clubs’ stocks are relatively thinly traded and in
light of the systematic investors’ optimism that seemingly characterizes our sample teams,
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as documented in the next section. In what follows, we examine these two potential reasons
for the puzzling game-day returns.
The fact that game-day abnormal trading volume is higher for games with more infor-
mative outcome (wins and losses relative to draws, and eliminations relative to advances to
next round; see Table 3) is seemingly consistent with a leakage of result-relevant informa-
tion on game-days. Further analysis, however, does not support this interpretation. First,
the typical game-day returns in Table 6 do not follow the ordering implied by information-
based hypothesis (i.e. returns on days during which games are tied are higher than those
during days in which a public team wins). Second, untabulated results show that (subjec-
tive) odds typically move against our sample teams on game days, which is inconsistent
with the idea that the typical flow of information released to market participants is pos-
itive on game days.18 Moreover, the correlation between game-day returns and changes
in estimated winning and losing probabilities during game-days is virtually zero. Third,
in the subsample of 31 games in which both teams are public, the two teams experience
game-day returns of the same sign in 16 cases and, among these, both returns are positive
in 13 cases. This is inconsistent with new information arrival since positive news for one
team should be regarded as negative for the rival team. Finally, the correlation between
game-day return and eventual outcome is not significantly diﬀerent from zero.
The evidence seems to be more supportive of the price pressure hypothesis. First,
there is a statistically significant, positive correlation of 13% between game-day abnormal
volume and abnormal return, while the correlation between game-day volume and the
absolute value of game-day return is an insignificant 6%. If there were no new information
released on game days, buying pressure would lead to a positive correlation between volume
and returns. If there were no price pressure and all trading was a result of new information,
one would expect a positive correlation between volume and absolute returns. Thus, the
volume-return correlation is more consistent with the price pressure hypothesis. Second,
there is a statistically significant, negative correlation of -11% between game-day returns
and following day returns, consistent the existence of partial reversal of price-pressure-
driven game-day returns on the following day and inconsistent with information leakage
18 Investors’ subjective estimates of winning probabilities drop by 2.4% on average on game days, while
their estimates of losing probabilities increase by 2.1%. Please see the discussion of our proxy for investors’
subjective beliefs in the next section.
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on game-days.
Overall, the evidence suggests that at least part of the positive mean game-day returns
is due to price pressure created by overly optimistic investors. Since such price pressure is
likely to be partially reversed following resolutions of uncertainty, we control for game-day
returns in our analysis of the causes of large negative returns following games, which is
presented in the next two sections.
6 Proxies for investors’ beliefs and objective probabilities
Behavioral finance literature oﬀers two explanations for the ineﬃcient stock price reac-
tion to game results documented in the previous section. First, investors may set prices
based on unbiased beliefs of conditional post-game club values, yet systematically mises-
timate the likelihood of various outcomes. If investors are too optimistic about publicly
traded clubs’ chances to succeed, on average, they will be disappointed ex-post, resulting
in larger (smaller) negative (positive) surprises than under the premise of eﬃcient capital
markets. Thus, the first potential reason for the reported negative post-game returns may
be investors’ optimism when forming beliefs about the probabilities of potential game
outcomes. Another explanation for the apparent market ineﬃciency is that the reported
stock price reaction is driven by investors’ post-event emotional reaction, as in the case
of national team matches in Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2007). In this section and the
next one we concentrate on the eﬀects of investor ex-ante biased beliefs on stock returns.
Specifically, in this section we examine the extent of investors’ optimism and in Section 7
we quantify the eﬀects of this optimism on expected post-game returns.
To determine whether investors’ biased ex-ante beliefs are partially responsible for the
negative mean return around soccer games, we incorporate measures of investors’ expecta-
tions in our analysis and compare them with objective probabilities of match outcomes. In
what follows, we discuss our proxies for subjective and objective expectations and examine
the potential biases associated with them.
6.1 Bookmaker odds as a proxy for objective probabilities
The proxy for the likelihoods of sporting events’ outcomes that is most widely used in
the literature is bookmaker odds in the case of soccer (e.g., Palomino, Renneboog and
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Zhang (2005)) and bookmaker spreads in the case of basketball (e.g., Brown and Hartzell
(2001)).19
Bookmaker odds are generally found to be unbiased predictors of game outcomes (see
Sauer (1998) for a survey of wagering markets literature).20 For this reason, we derive our
estimates of objective probabilities of wins, losses, and draws from bookmaker odds. We
obtain bookmaker odds from Betexplorer (www.betexplorer.com). This website compiles
odds from various bookmakers, reporting the best historical odds for each potential out-
come. Betexplorer reports odds for 582 games, corresponding to more than 90% of our
sample. We follow Palomino, Renneboog and Zhang (2005) and translate the odds into
probabilities using the following transformation:
 = 11 + 1 + 1  (5)
where  is the odds-based probability of a win, and , ,  are the odds
of win, tie, and loss, respectively, and similarly for  and . Panel A of
Table 7 shows the comparison between the probabilities based on bookmaker odds and the
observed distribution of game outcomes.
Insert Table 7 here
The diﬀerences between the odds-based probabilities and the in-sample proportions
of game outcomes are generally small. For the full sample, on average, bookmakers are
almost exactly on target in forecasting winning odds, and they are not far oﬀ in predicting
losing odds (32% expected versus 34% realized). When analyzing various subsamples,
however, it appears that bookmakers have biased expectations in some cases. For instance,
there is substantial bias when teams are ranked higher than their opponents: on average,
19An alternative proxy is in-sample fitted values from models relating game results to ex-ante team
characteristics. Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2007) report that the correlation between in-sample fitted
values and bookmaker odds is above 90%. This is also the case in our sample.
20There are some exceptions to the eﬃciency of bookmaker odds/spreads as predictors of match out-
comes. For example, Golec and Tamarkin (1991) and Gray and Gray (1991) document that betting on
home teams that are underdogs in National Football League matches generates substantial returns net of
comissions. Zuber, Gandar and Bowers (1985) also identify profitable strategies associated with football
betting. Vlastakis, Dotsis and Markellos (2006) document an “away-favorite” bias in the European soccer
bookmaker odds.
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bookmakers underestimate (overestimate) the winning (losing) chances of favorites and
severely overestimate (underestimate) the winning (losing) chances of underdogs. This
finding is in contrast with the evidence in Golec and Tamarkin (1991) and Gray and Gray
(1997) of the bias towards favorites in the case of National Football League spreads.
Bookmaker odds, while providing a good measure of the objective probabilities of game
outcomes, may not capture investors’ subjective ex-ante beliefs (e.g., Levitt (2004)). Yet,
pre-event securities’ prices should reflect investors’ (subjective) beliefs about the distri-
bution of post-event prices rather than true (i.e. objective) probabilities of possible re-
alizations of uncertainty. However, investors’ subjective expectations are impossible to
observe and hard to estimate. In what follows, we propose a new proxy for investors’
beliefs and incorporate it in our investigation of the market’s ineﬃcient response to soccer
game outcomes.
6.2 Betting exchange prices as a proxy for investors’ beliefs
Our approach to estimating investors’ beliefs relies on prices of contracts traded on betting
exchanges or “prediction markets”. These trading venues are similar to more traditional
exchanges. Prices of traded contracts are determined solely by the demand for and supply
of these contracts, with the exchanges’ role limited to providing a trading platform and
clearing services. An example of such contract is a security paying $1 in case of Manchester
United defeating Benfica Lisbon in a Champions League game and paying nothing other-
wise.21 The interpretation of betting exchange prices as beliefs regarding probabilities of
game outcomes held by investors in soccer clubs’ stocks hinges on four important assump-
tions.
Assumption 1: Betting exchange equilibrium prices represent traders’ beliefs
This assumption is theoretically justified. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) demonstrate that
prediction markets eﬃciently aggregate traders’ beliefs. Specifically, they show that if
traders have logarithmic utilities, then equilibrium betting exchange prices equal traders’
average beliefs regarding the likelihoods of event outcomes, weighed by traders’ wealth.
They also show that for other specifications of traders’ utilities, prediction market prices
21Some betting exchanges, such as Betfair, quote prices of contracts in the form of odds in order to cater
to traders that are more familiar with this way of price quotation.
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are usually close to traders’ mean beliefs. Similarly, Gjerstad (2005) shows that for rea-
sonable coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion, equilibrium betting exchange prices are in line
with traders’ mean beliefs. Thus, abstracting for now from the possibility of arbitrage be-
tween betting exchanges and bookmakers, prediction market prices are likely to represent
aggregate beliefs of traders.
Assumption 2: The majority of traders in public firms’ contracts are public
teams’ fans
Traders in contracts involving matches of public teams can be split into at least two groups
based on which team they support. Thus, betting exchange prices aggregate not only the
beliefs of public teams’ fans but also the beliefs of opposing teams’ fans. To the extent
that both groups of traders are overly optimistic regarding their respective teams’ winning
chances, the equilibrium prices would not equal the mean subjective expectations of public
teams’ fans. However, if the latter constitute a majority of traders in these contracts,
betting exchange prices would reflect over-optimism in public clubs’ fans’ to some degree.
There are reasons to believe that in a typical match between a public team and a private
one the public club’s fans are likely to dominate the trading. Casual observation suggests
that public teams typically hail from larger cities and have larger stadium capacities,
implying a larger fan base. In addition, as demonstrated in Table 1, public teams are
typically ranked higher than their opponents, a fact also consistent with a larger fan base.22
To summarize, fans of both public teams and their opponents are likely to be among the
traders of respective contracts. Thus, betting exchange prices are not going to equal
public teams’ fans’ beliefs. As a result, although we expect public teams’ fans to typically
dominate the trading in prediction markets, betting exchange prices likely provide an
estimate of public team investors’ beliefs that is biased towards objective probabilities.
Assumption 3: There are limits to arbitrage between betting exchanges and
bookmakers
22Consistent with the assertion that better teams have larger fan bases, the diﬀerences between subjective
and objective expectations are larger for favorites than for underdogs (see Panel C of Table 7) below. In
addition, the diﬀerences between subjective and objective expectations are larger for teams with larger
market values (this result is available upon request).
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If traders on betting exchanges monitor odds posted by bookmakers,23 betting exchange
prices are not likely to deviate from prices derived from bookmakers odds by more than
the diﬀerence of the respective transaction costs. The mean sum of the probabilities of
wins, draws, and odds, implied by bookmaker odds, is about 1.08, resulting in the mean
transaction cost of 8%, while the average fee charged by the betting exchanges in our sample
is close to 3%. Thus, typically, a diﬀerence of up to 5% between betting exchange prices
and bookmakers odds can not be arbitraged away and may persist. Furthermore, trading
on betting exchanges may have additional benefits. For example, betting exchanges, unlike
bookmakers, allow trading during games. In addition, betting exchanges may serve as social
networks for teams’ fans. While these considerations may result in a higher upper bound
for the diﬀerence between betting exchange prices and bookmaker odds, large deviations
of traders’ beliefs from bookmaker odds are not going to be fully reflected in equilibrium
betting exchange prices.
Assumption 4: Betting exchanges and stock markets are integrated
While there is no guarantee that traders on betting exchanges hold soccer clubs’ shares,
there are reasons to believe that they do. Numerous studies document investors’ tendency
to invest in stocks they are familiar with. Examples include home country bias (French
and Poterba (1991)), local bias of individual investors (Huberman (2001)) and mutual fund
managers (Coval and Moskowitz (1999)), and employees’ tendency to hold disproportion-
ately large positions in their employer’s stock (Benartzi (2001)). Soccer fans trading on
betting exchanges are clearly familiar with their clubs. Thus, we argue that they are likely
to hold their teams’ shares and betting exchanges are at least to some degree integrated
with markets on which clubs’ stocks trade.
Because the assumptions above are not likely to be fully satisfied in the data, the validity
of our proposed measure of investors’ beliefs is ultimately an empirical issue. As we show
below, our approach leads to results that are quite diﬀerent from those obtained using the
traditional bookmaker odds-based proxy for the probability distribution of possible game
outcomes.
We obtain the prices of contracts on wins, losses, and draws of our sample teams from
23There is some empirical evidence to the contrary. For example, Palomino, Renneboog and Zhang (2005)
report that investors do not seem to pay attention to releases of bookmaker odds.
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two betting exchanges: Betfair (www.betfair.com) and Tradesports (www.tradesports.com).
Betfair is by far the largest betting exchange in the world. The typical volume of contracts
traded on this exchange is quite large, over $240,000 for each outcome (over $320,000 for
win- and loss-contracts and about $55,000 for draw-contracts). The volume on Trade-
sports is several orders of magnitudes smaller. Thus, we use Betfair as our main source to
estimate subjective probabilities of game outcomes. The main drawback is that Betfair his-
torical data only start in 2004, limiting the number of contracts on game outcomes to 483,
corresponding to 161 sample games. Thus, we complement these data using Tradesports
contracts for years 2001-2003. Tradesports data are spotty, however. In addition, Trade-
sports contracts generally feature larger, more established clubs, which are more likely to
violate our second assumption, regarding relative fan bases of public teams and their oppo-
nents. After imposing the restriction of at least $100 volume on each of the three possible
contracts on a given game, we obtain data for contracts on 40 more games, increasing our
betting exchange prices sample to 211 games.24 25
To calculate investors’ subjective probabilities of each of the three possible outcomes,
we compute the volume-weighted average of prices on each contract matched prior to the
start of the game (contracts that are not “in play”). Because the sum of the average prices
on win, draw, and loss contracts does not usually equal exactly one, we scale each contract’s
price by the combined price on the three contracts. For example, the implied probability
of a win,  , is computed as
 =  +  +   (6)
where , , and  are the prices of win, draw, and loss contracts respectively.
Panel B of Table 7 reports the typical probabilities implied by betting exchange prices for
various contracts and compares them to the in-sample distribution of match outcomes.
On average, investors that trade on betting exchanges are overly optimistic about their
teams’ prospects. They assign an average probability of 44% (30%) to a win (loss), while
the in-sample proportion of wins (losses) is 37% (38%). The diﬀerences between expected
24Limiting our sample to Betfair prices only does not alter the qualitative results reported below.
25Games featuring two public teams clearly violate Assumption 2 above. Thus, in the 16 games featuring
two public teams, we only include the favorite team in the sample, with the idea that favorites are more
likely to have larger fan bases than underdogs.
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and realized outcomes are marginally significant. Except for the case of teams playing
on home turf, the mean diﬀerences between expected and in-sample probabilities of wins
(losses) are uniformly positive (negative) and are statistically significant in many cases.
Investors’ optimism is most pronounced for games in advanced stages of the competitions:
the win probability of 34% implied by exchange prices is significantly diﬀerent from the
realized proportion of wins of 13%. Furthermore, investors are grossly overoptimistic about
the winning chances of underdogs (27% expected versus 16% realized) and of teams playing
away from home (33% expected versus 21% realized).
One potential reason for the diﬀerences between investors’ beliefs and game results
may be that our subsample of games with available data on betting exchange prices com-
prises a set of particularly surprising game outcomes that could not have been rationally
expected ex-ante. To investigate this possibility, in Panel C of Table 7 we compare betting
exchange prices with probabilities implied by bookmaker odds for the subset of 203 games
for which both are available. Traders on betting exchanges are significantly more optimistic
than bookmakers across all subsamples. The average betting exchange-based probability
of winning is 44%, compared with the average odds-based probability of 39%. Betting
exchange investors are especially optimistic in early stages of the competitions and when
teams are favorites or when they play at home. In these cases, the probabilities of winning
(losing) implied by betting exchange prices are 5-6% higher (lower) than those implied by
bookmaker odds.
To complement the univariate analysis above, we estimate ordered logit models relating
game outcomes to betting exchange prices and game characteristics. This method repre-
sents an extension of the test proposed in Gray and Gray (1997) for the case of football
spreads. Specifically, we estimate the following model:
ln
µ ( ≤ )
1− ( ≤ )
¶
= −−−
X

 (7)
where  = 1 for wins,  = 2 for draws, and  = 3 for losses.  can take the values
of 1 or 2.  and  take the values of  and , in the case of
betting exchange-based probabilities, or the values of  and , in the case of
bookmaker odds-based probabilities.  are de-meaned dummy variables for home/away
game, favorite/underdog status, and stage of a competition, similar to (4). Table 8 presents
the estimates of (7). The coeﬃcient estimates on the indicator variables, , are of main
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interest. Under the null hypothesis of no bias,  should have no explanatory power;
significant coeﬃcient estimates would suggest specific biases in the predicted probabilities
of possible game outcomes. Panel A of Table 8 presents the results for the samples of
games in which bookmaker odds and betting exchange prices are available separately.
Panel B displays the results for the sample of games in which both proxies for objective
and subjective probabilities are available. Columns 1 and 2 in each panel examine biases in
the exchange-based probabilities, while columns 3-4 present the results for the bookmaker
odds-based probabilities.
Insert Table 8 here
Not surprisingly, both  and  are very good predictors of whether a sample
team wins, as evidenced by the near-zero p-values of the corresponding coeﬃcients’ 2.
Consistent with the univariate results in Table 8, the coeﬃcient estimates for home games
suggest a marginally significant “home bias” when using the exchange-based probabilities.
The regressions using bookmaker-odds-based probabilities reveal no statistically significant
biases. These results, together with the diﬀerences between the probabilities implied by
bookmaker odds and by betting exchange prices reported in the previous table, underscore
the importance of choosing a valid proxy for investors’ expectations when examining the
market reaction to event outcomes.
7 Returns adjusted for expected outcomes
The evidence in the previous section demonstrates that the ex-ante probabilities of game
outcomes implied by prices of contracts traded on betting exchanges are biased, on average,
both relative to the actual distribution of game outcomes and relative to the probabilities
of outcomes implied by bookmaker odds. In this section we investigate whether investors’
biased beliefs contribute to the negative mean return following soccer games.
If investors set a club’s stock price prior to a game, 0, as the weighted average of
post-game values, with weights equal to their subjective probabilities of game outcomes,
then 0 can be expressed as
0 =   +  + (1−  − ) (8)
where , , and  are the club’s post-game rational values conditional on various
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game outcomes. Then, the post-game realized return, , is
 =  +  + −  +  =
( − )
  +
( − )
 −
( − )
  −
( − )
  +  (9)
where  , , and  are indicator variables for wins, draws, and losses, respectively, and
 is a zero-mean error term. (9) provides the means to test whether pre-game prices are
determined based on investors’ (possibly biased) beliefs about game outcomes and on post-
game club values conditional on game outcomes. Under this null hypothesis, the coeﬃcients
in the following regression
 = +  +  +  +  +  (10)
must satisfy the set of restrictions:
 = −   = −   = 0 (11)
There is one diﬃculty in estimating (11). The cross-sectional variation in draw proba-
bility, , is very low. (Both subjective and objective probabilities of tying a game
are around 25% for nearly all games.) Thus, in order to achieve identification, we estimate
the following variant of (10), in which we incorporate the restriction  = − :
 = +  +  + ( − ) +  (12)
The set of restrictions in (12) is
 = −   = 0 (13)
In order to account for the large negative correlation between game-day returns and returns
on days following games, which is likely due, at least in part, to the reversal of game-day
price pressure, as previously discussed, we modify the regression in (12) by augmenting it
with day-zero return, 0:26
 = +  +  + ( − ) +0 +  (14)
26All the results below are insensitive to whether (12).is augmented by day-zero return.
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The estimates of the unrestricted model in (14) can be interpreted as follows. The intercept
is the mean return after a loss when the team is expected to lose with certainty ( = 0,
 = 0  = 0,  = 0). +  reflects the mean return after a win when
investors were expecting a loss,  +  +  is the return after an expected win,
and + corresponds to the mean return after a loss when investors were expecting
a win.
Insert Table 9 here
Panel A of Table 9 presents the results of estimating (14) and testing the set of restrictions
in (13) for samples of games for which bookmaker odds and betting exchange probabilities
are available separately. In columns 1-2, we estimate model (14) using betting exchange-
based probabilities. The results of the “unrestricted model” in column 1 are consistent with
the hypothesis that the market’s ineﬃcient response to match outcomes follows from biases
in investors’ ex-ante beliefs. The intercept is close to zero, suggesting that the market does
not react to expected losses. The estimates of  and  are of the same order of
magnitude and they have positive and negative signs, respectively, implying that expected
wins result in relatively mild negative market reactions. The Wald test reported at the
bottom of column 1 fails to reject the set of restrictions in (13).
In column 2, we examine a “semi-restricted” model, in which we impose a restriction
 = − :
 = + ( − ) + ( − ) +  (15)
and test the hypothesis  = 0 Rejection of this hypothesis would indicate that potential
biases in investors’ beliefs cannot explain the abnormally low returns following games. The
results of estimating (15) are presented in column 2. First, the intercept is not significantly
diﬀerent from zero. Second, the results provide an estimate of the economic importance
of diﬀerentiating between subjective and objective probabilities: when the probability of
a win increases by one percentage point and that of a loss decreases by the same amount,
the post-game mean return decreases by 2.5 basis points.
The inability to reject the set of restrictions in (13) in the restricted model and the
restriction on the intercept in the semi-restricted model stands in contrast to the evidence
reported in Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2007), who show that controlling for ex-ante ex-
pectations cannot explain the market’s ineﬃcient response to international soccer game
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results. An important reason for this discrepancy is that we use probabilities derived from
betting exchange prices as a proxy for investors’ beliefs. These estimates of subjective
probabilities diﬀer systematically from the in-sample distribution of game outcomes. Ed-
mans, Garcia and Norli, on the other hand, use in-sample fitted values of match results
conditional on team characteristics, which results in estimates of win and loss probabilities
that are unbiased on average, while estimating a regression similar to (14).
To confirm our conjecture that diﬀerences in the measure of investors’ expectations may
explain the discrepancy between our results and those in Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2007),
in columns 3-4 of Panel A we estimate models (14) and (15) using the probabilities implied
by bookmaker odds. As shown in Table 7, on average, bookmakers’ implied probabilities
are not significantly diﬀerent from the realized distribution of game outcomes. Based on the
Wald test reported in column 3, the set of restrictions in (13) can be comfortably rejected
at any confidence level, as evidenced by near-zero p-values. Therefore, the tests using
investors’ subjective expectations, as proxied by betting exchange prices, generate results
that are very diﬀerent from those obtained using objective expectations, as proxied by
bookmaker odds. The evidence in column 4 is also illustrative of the diﬀerences between
investors’ subjective and objective probabilities. The intercept is significantly negative,
implying that pre-game stock prices do not equal objective expectations of post-game
prices.
One potential reason for the ability to reject the set of restrictions in (13) when us-
ing bookmaker-odds-implied probabilities but not when using betting-exchange-based ones
could be the diﬀerent compositions of the samples of games with available betting exchange
prices data and bookmaker odds data and the sizes of these samples. To address this issue,
in Panel B of Table 9 we re-estimate the regressions above using the sample of 203 games
for which both objective and subjective probabilities are available. The results in Panel B
are similar to those discussed above in that the restrictions can be comfortably rejected in
a model that uses bookmaker odds but not in a model that uses betting exchange prices.
Similarly, the intercept in the semi-restricted model in (15) is significantly negative when
bookmaker odds data are being used, while it is insignificantly diﬀerent from zero when
betting exchange prices are used.
The evidence in this section supports the idea that investors’ inability to correctly an-
ticipate game outcomes is at least partially responsible for the significantly negative mean
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abnormal return following European soccer matches. However, it is important to emphasize
that while our findings show that investors’ biased ex-ante beliefs are an important compo-
nent of the market’s post-game reaction, they do not rule out the possibility of emotional
ex-post reactions aﬀecting post-game returns as well. By design, our tests aim to isolate
the portion of post-game returns that is due to investors’ overly optimistic expectations
of game outcomes. Such tests do not allow us to draw inferences regarding the eﬀects of
post-game emotional reactions on post-game returns.
8 Conclusions
We investigate the eﬀect of biased ex-ante estimates of probabilities of future event out-
comes on stock returns of publicly traded European soccer clubs around important matches.
Consistent with past studies of securities prices’ reaction to sporting events (e.g., Brown
and Hartzell (2001) and Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2007)), we find that the market reaction
to soccer games’ outcomes is asymmetric. Losses are associated with significantly negative
post-game returns, while wins are followed by near-zero returns. Overall, the mean return
following games is significantly negative. This finding suggests that the market does not
react eﬃciently to the outcome of soccer games played by publicly traded clubs.
While a sample of publicly traded soccer teams provides a particularly convenient ex-
perimental setting for examining the sources of investor sentiment, distinguishing between
the two types of sentiment that drive the market’s ineﬃcient response to resolution of un-
certainty — biased ex-ante expectations and emotional ex-post reactions to event outcomes
— can be crucial for firm value maximization in settings extending far beyond public sports
franchises. Firms’ investment decisions, which include both capital investments and ac-
quisitions of other firms, as well as corporate control decisions, are based in part on firms’
observed market values. Thus, knowing whether market values are more eﬃcient before or
after uncertainties are resolved can facilitate decision making and enhance firm value.
We introduce a new proxy for investors’ beliefs that is based on prices of contracts
traded on betting exchanges and argue that this measure is more closely related to investors’
subjective expectations than measures based on bookmaker odds. The tests based on our
novel measure suggest that the observed market ineﬃciency is caused, in substantial part,
by investors’ inability to form unbiased beliefs about future event outcomes. Investors in
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soccer clubs tend to be overly optimistic about their teams’ prospects, leading, more often
than not, to disappointments upon resolutions of the uncertainty.
Although we cannot generalize our conclusions on the nature of investor sentiment
beyond the special case of sport sentiment examined here, our approach to analyzing de-
viations from market eﬃciency can potentially be applied to other settings. An analysis
of the causes of investor sentiment in diﬀerent settings depends crucially on the ability to
estimate investors’ beliefs regarding the likelihood of future events. Developing prediction
markets featuring contracts based on economic and financial uncertainties, as suggested
by Arrow et al. (2007), may provide a way to estimate investors’ subjective expectations
of future events. Analyzing potential biases in the prices of event contracts could enhance
our understanding of the observed deviations from market eﬃciency and enhance firms’
value-maximizing decision making.
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Figure 1: Biases in ex-ante beliefs and irrational ex-post reactions: An
illustration
This figure presents three scenarios. In Figure 1a, investors’ ex-ante beliefs are unbiased
and ex-post reactions are rational. In Figure 1b, investors beliefs are biased, but ex-post
reactions are rational. In Figure 1c, investors’ beliefs are unbiased, but they overreact to
good and bad outcomes ex-post.
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Table 1 – Match statistics, market values, and operating performance measures of publicly traded soccer clubs 
This table reports match statistics, market values, and operating performance measures of 20 soccer clubs that were publicly traded at any time between January, 
2000 and June, 2006 and have played at least one game in the Champions League or UEFA Cup during this period. All Champions League and UEFA Cup 
games listed by Rec.Sport.Soccer Statistics Foundations at www.rsssf.com are included in the sample. Panel A reports summary statistics by club, Panel B 
reports country-level statistics, and Panel C reports statistics for the whole sample. # games is the number of matches played. # games public opponents is the 
number of matches played against another publicly traded club. # games elimination is the number of matches that are either the second game of a knock-out 
stage or the last game of a group stage. # games Champions League is the number of matches played in the Champions League competition. # games advanced 
stages is the number of matches played in quarterfinal, semifinal, and final stages of the Champions League and the UEFA Cup, as well as the second group 
stage of the Champions League. # games home is the number of matches played at home. # games favorite is the number of matches in which the team’s UEFA 
rating prior to the match is higher than its opponent’s one. The ratings are obtained from www.xs4all.nl/~kassiesa/bert/uefa/data. Win is the proportion of 
matches won. Loss is the proportion of matches lost. Advance is the proportion of elimination matches after which a team moved on to the next stage of the 
competition. Goals scored:received is the mean number of own versus opponent goals. Games with betting exchange prices and/or games with bookmaker odds 
denote the number of games with available variables. Market values and accounting variables are from Datastream, they are expressed in U.S. dollars based on 
exchange rates from Datastream. MV equity is the average market value of equity over the sample period, computed as the average of the product of the number 
of shares outstanding and the stock price one day prior to the games.  Sales (Assets) is the average annual sales (book assets) over the sample period. ROA is the 
average annual return on assets, defined as the ratio of EBITDA to lagged book assets. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20]
Team Country
#
Games
Champ. 
League 
Against
public 
teams Deciding 
Advanced 
stages Home 
As
 favorites
% 
wins
% 
losses
% 
advance
With 
exchange 
prices
With 
bookmaker 
odds
With 
Both
Market 
Cap
($MM)
Sales 
($MM)
Assets 
($MM) ROA
Aalborg Denmark 6 0 0 3 0 3 2 16.7% 50.0% 33.3% 4 3 3 9.06 12.63 22.87 0.09
Ajax Holland 50 44 0 13 10 25 26 34.0% 34.0% 46.2% 30 48 30 130.88 63.66 116.92 0.17
Aston Villa England 2 0 0 1 0 1 2 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0 2 0 26.60 52.71 101.92 0.10
Besiktas Turkey 32 6 0 11 2 15 16 34.4% 40.6% 63.6% 14 29 12 111.58
B. Dortmund Germany 35 27 0 10 11 16 28 45.7% 31.4% 58.3% 0 33 0 89.00 95.27 219.93 0.16
Brondby Denmark 21 9 2 10 0 10 14 33.3% 42.9% 40.0% 4 19 3 34.24 16.29 59.07 0.11
Celtic Scotland 52 26 2 19 7 27 26 48.1% 36.5% 63.2% 10 49 10 35.63 83.43 126.17 0.08
Fenerbahce Turkey 13 11 0 3 0 6 0 23.1% 69.2% 0.0% 13 13 13 250.89
Galatasaray Turkey 21 17 0 6 3 11 15 23.8% 47.6% 16.7% 7 19 7 76.25
Juventus Italy 51 51 4 15 25 25 35 51.0% 31.4% 66.7% 29 50 29 254.72 202.38 464.48 0.20
Lazio Italy 52 34 4 14 16 26 50 42.3% 32.7% 62.5% 8 50 8 175.14 98.31 440.34 0.08
Man. United England 81 81 4 19 36 41 76 54.3% 21.0% 57.1% 27 71 26 897.26 222.84 368.01 0.23
Millwall England 2 0 0 1 0 1 2 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 2 2 2 15.64 11.71 32.79 -0.18
Newcastle England 35 14 2 13 12 18 21 60.0% 25.7% 69.2% 12 29 10 79.40 137.07 291.52 0.13
Porto Portugal 75 52 7 25 29 37 53 38.7% 32.0% 66.7% 16 73 16 41.51 28.42 97.40 0.10
Roma Italy 56 30 3 16 12 28 38 39.3% 28.6% 52.9% 17 53 17 129.45 113.44 322.40 0.21
Silkeborg Denmark 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0 2 0 0.88 5.08 7.68 0.11
Southampton England 2 0 0 1 0 1 2 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0 2 0 19.09 64.07 102.55 0.21
Sporting Portugal 36 9 3 13 5 20 22 41.7% 36.1% 53.3% 16 34 16 42.07
Trabzonspor Turkey 2 2 0 1 0 1 2 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 2 1 1 90.39
1.83:0.91
1:2
Match statistics Market values and performance measures
1.31:2.31
1.05:1.33
1.57:1.04
1.56:1.23
0.67:1.5
1.32:1.08
1.5:1.5
1.47:1.25
1.46:1.17
1.24:1.24
1.69:1.17
1.86:1.26
1.41:1.07
1.3:1.05
0.5:2.5
Goals 
scored: 
received
0.5:1
1.61:1.44
1:1.5
Panel A - 
By team
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[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20]
Country
#
Games
Champ. 
League 
Against
public 
teams Deciding 
Advanced 
stages Home 
As
 favorites
% 
wins
% 
losses
% 
advance
With 
exchange 
prices
With 
bookmaker 
odds
With 
Both
Market 
Cap
($MM)
Sales 
($MM)
Assets 
($MM) ROA
Denmark 29 9 2 14 0 14 16 27.6% 48.3% 35.7% 8 24 6 26.73 14.92 49.90 0.11
England 122 95 6 35 48 62 103 54.1% 23.8% 56.8% 41 106 38 619.50 189.38 331.85 0.19
Germany 35 27 0 10 11 16 28 45.7% 31.4% 58.3% 0 33 0 89.00 95.27 219.93 0.16
Holland 50 44 0 13 10 25 26 34.0% 34.0% 46.2% 30 48 30 130.88 63.66 116.92 0.17
Italy 159 115 11 45 53 79 123 44.0% 30.8% 60.4% 54 153 54 184.57 137.02 406.54 0.16
Portugal 111 61 10 38 34 57 75 39.6% 33.3% 61.9% 32 107 32 41.69 28.42 97.40 0.10
Scotland 52 26 2 19 7 27 26 48.1% 36.5% 63.2% 10 49 10 35.63 83.43 126.17 0.08
Turkey 68 36 0 21 5 33 33 29.4% 48.5% 38.1% 36 62 33 126.68
Match statistics Market values and performance measures
1.07:1.38
1.69:1.17
1.29:1.49
1.8:1.04
1.46:1.17
1.32:1.08
1.47:1.11
Panel B - 
By country
[13]
Goals 
scored: 
received
1.48:1.19
 
 
[3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20]
#
Games
Champ. 
League 
Against
public 
teams Deciding 
Advanced 
stages Home 
As
 favorites
% 
wins
% 
losses
% 
advance
With 
exchange 
prices
With 
bookmaker 
odds
With 
Both
Market 
Cap
($MM)
Sales 
($MM)
Assets 
($MM) ROA
626 413 31 195 168 313 430 42.5% 33.4% 55.3% 211 582 203 208.39 114.39 261.90 0.15
Market values and performance measuresMatch statisticsPanel C - 
All
1.5:1.17
[13]
Goals 
scored: 
received
 
 
 
 
 37 
 
Table 2 – Clubs’ operating income and sports performance 
This table presents panel regression estimates of the relation between the Return n Assets (ROA) of publicly 
traded soccer clubs and their performance in Champions League and UEFA Cup competitions. Market 
Value is the market value of equity of a sample club at the end of year t. ROA  is a club’s ratio of EBITDA 
in year t to book assets in year t − 1. Champions League dummy equals one if the club played at least one 
game in the Champions League competition during year t. High stage dummy equals one if the team 
reached an advanced stage of either of the two European competitions during year t, as defined in Table 1. 
# games is the number of games played in the two European competitions during year t. UEFA Rating is 
the team’s year-t rating obtained from www.xs4all.nl/~kassiesa/bert/uefa/data. All models include club-
level fixed effects. Standard errors of coefficient estimates are clustered by firm, as in Petersen (2007), and 
the corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
[1] [2] [3] [4]
0.0833 0.0973 0.091 0.058
(3.55) (4.07) (3.89) (2.14)
0.0921
(2.94)
0.0765
(2.39)
0.006
(2.15)
0.0012
(3.18)
R2 0.582 0.551 0.543 0.592
# obs. 93 93 93 93
UEFA Rating 
in year t
Intercept
Return on Asset in year t
Participated in 
Champions League in year t
Qualified to advanced 
stage of competition in year t
Number of games 
played in year t
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Table 3 – Trading volume and volatility around game days 
This table presents mean abnormal daily trading volume around Champions League and UEFA Cup game 
days. We obtain the number of shares traded daily for each club from Datastream and define abnormal 
trading volume for three days around a game, AVOLUMEi,t, as: 
 
AVOLUMEi,t = ln(VOLUMEi,t/VOLUMEi,t−5) 
 
where VOLUMEi,t is the trading volume on game-days and days following games and VOLUMEi,t−5 is the 
trading volume five trading days before. On rare occasions when a club plays two games one week apart – 
this happens sometimes in qualifying rounds, we use VOLi,t+5 instead or VOLi,t-10. In parentheses, the table 
reports t-statistics for H0: mean(AVOL)=0. N is the number of club-games in each subsample with available 
data on trading volume. 
Game day Following day # obs
24.50% 38.78%
(3.92) (5.80)
25.13% 39.34%
(2.71) (3.79)
8.66% 24.95%
(0.68) (1.89)
35.21% 47.43%
(3.14) (4.08)
37.14% 70.44%
(3.62) (5.96)
23.19% 54.16%
(1.56) (3.19)
52.44% 87.91%
(3.77) (5.41)
18.18% 30.00%
(2.32) (2.88) 348
Deciding games
175
174
91
83
Losses
Advances
Eliminations
Non-deciding games
522
220
127
All games
Wins
Draws
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Table 4 – Post-match returns by game outcome 
This table presents mean abnormal returns following games won, lost, or tied by publicly traded soccer 
clubs participating in Champions League and UEFA Cup competitions. The market model for each club i in 
each calendar year, T, is estimated as 
titiTitLMTitLMTiTiTti RRRR ,1,,,31,,,2,,,1,,    , 
where Ri,t is the daily return on stock i on day t belonging to year T, RLM,t (RLM,t-1) is the (lagged) value-
weighted local market return, RLM,t-1 is lagged daily return on stock i, and εi,t is the daily abnormal return. 
The columns under Wins (Draws, Losses) correspond to Champions League and UEFA Cup games won 
(tied, lost) by a sample club. In parentheses, the table reports t-statistics for H0: mean(Return)=0. N is the 
number of club-games in each subsample. Columns Wins  minus Losses and Draws minus Losses report the 
respective differences with t-statistics for the differences in parentheses. Column All refers to the full 
sample.  
Wins Draws Losses All Win-Loss Draw-Loss
0.15% -0.89% -2.18% -0.88% 2.33% 1.29%
(0.80) (-4.64) (-9.26) (-6.90) (7.75) (4.27)
266 151 209 626
Home and 
away games
-0.08% -1.32% -3.04% -0.98% 2.95% 1.72%
(-0.34) (-4.77) (-5.99) (-5.16) (5.28) (2.98)
173 76 64 313
0.58% -0.45% -1.80% -0.77% 2.38% 1.35%
(1.94) (-1.76) (-7.21) (-4.58) (6.12) (3.78)
93 75 145 313
Favorites and 
underdogs
-0.05% -0.85% -2.66% -0.91% 2.61% 1.81%
(-0.24) (-3.97) (-7.93) (-5.98) (6.67) (4.56)
219 100 111 430
1.08% -0.96% -1.63% -0.81% 2.70% 0.66%
(2.30) (-2.52) (-5.09) (-3.48) (4.78) (1.33)
47 51 98 196
Advanced and 
early stages
0.00% -0.63% -1.74% -0.70% 1.73% 1.11%
(-0.01) (-2.78) (-7.28) (-5.02) (5.41) (3.36)
212 98 148 458
0.75% -1.36% -3.24% -1.37% 3.99% 1.89%
(2.08) (-4.02) (-6.01) (-4.87) (6.15) (2.96)
54 53 61 168
Advanced Eliminated All
0.17% -2.41% -1.05%
(0.63) (-5.59) (-3.99)
103 92 195
Early stages
Advanced stages
Home games
Away games
Favorites
Underdogs
2.58%
Adv-Elim
(5.09)Deciding games
All games
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Table 5 – Multivariate analysis of the relation between returns and sports performance 
This table presents OLS estimates of the relation between post-game returns, game outcomes, and other 
match characteristics. In particular, the following model is estimated: 
 
i
j
iijjLoss
j
iijjWiniLossiWinii LIWILWReturn    ,_,_  
where Returni is club-game i’s abnormal return as defined in Table 4; Wi (Li) is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the publicly traded team won (lost) the game, and equals zero otherwise; Ij,is are three 
indicator variables that equal one if the team played at home (Home), if it was the favorite for the game 
(Favorite), and if the game was played in an advanced stage of the competition (Advanced stage), 
respectively. All indicator variables (Ij,i) are normalized to have zero mean. In parentheses, the table reports 
t-statistics for H0: coefficient=0.  
[1] [2]
-0.89% -0.89%
(-3.60) (-3.70)
1.03% 1.32%
(3.37) (4.23)
-1.29% -1.74%
(-4.01) (-5.21)
-0.68%
(-1.81)
-1.44%
(-3.21)
-1.06%
(-2.23)
-1.35%
(-3.27)
0.61%
(1.36)
-1.57%
(-3.50)
R squared 0.1004 0.1555
# obs 626 626
Win 
Intercept
Loss * Favorite
Win * Advanced stage
Loss * Advanced stage
Loss
Win * Home
Loss * Home
Win * Favorite
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Table 6 – Game-day returns  
This table presents mean abnormal game-day returns for games won, lost, or tied by publicly traded soccer 
clubs participating in Champions League and UEFA Cup competitions. The market model for each club i in 
each calendar year, T, is estimated as 
titiTitLMTitLMTiTiTti RRRR ,1,,,31,,,2,,,1,,    , 
where Ri,t is the daily return on stock i on day t belonging to year T, RLM,t (RLM,t-1) is the (lagged) value-
weighted local market return, RLM,t-1 is lagged daily return on stock i, and εi,t is the daily abnormal return. 
The columns under Wins (Draws, Losses) correspond to Champions League and UEFA Cup games won 
(tied, lost) by a sample club. In parentheses, the table reports t-statistics for H0: mean(Return)=0. N is the 
number of club-games in each subsample. Columns Wins  minus Losses and Draws minus Losses report the 
respective differences with t-statistics for the differences in parentheses. Column All refers to the full 
sample.  
Wins Draws Losses All Win-Loss Draw-Loss
0.48% 0.79% 0.22% 0.47% 0.26% 0.57%
(3.64) (3.11) (1.15) (4.47) (1.13) (1.79)
266 151 209 626
Home and 
away games
0.54% 0.92% 0.12% 0.55% 0.42% 0.80%
(3.44) (2.70) (0.39) (4.02) (1.22) (1.73)
173 76 64 313
0.37% 0.66% 0.27% 0.39% 0.11% 0.40%
(1.54) (1.74) (1.11) (2.45) (0.32) (0.88)
93 75 145 313
Favorites and 
underdogs
0.46% 0.78% 0.48% 0.54% -0.02% 0.30%
(3.15) (2.41) (2.26) (4.53) (-0.07) (0.79)
219 100 111 430
0.60% 0.82% -0.07% 0.32% 0.67% 0.89%
(1.81) (1.98) (-0.21) (1.52) (1.44) (1.68)
47 51 98 196
Advanced and 
early stages
0.45% 0.79% 0.19% 0.44% 0.27% 0.60%
(3.65) (2.39) (0.85) (3.81) (1.07) (1.52)
212 98 148 458
0.60% 0.80% 0.31% 0.56% 0.30% 0.49%
(1.37) (2.01) (0.78) (2.36) (0.50) (0.89)
54 53 61 168
Advanced Eliminated All
0.91% 0.08% 0.52%
(3.11) (0.31) (2.57)
103 92 195
Underdogs
Early stages
Advanced stages
Deciding games
All games
Home games
Away games
Favorites
0.82%
(2.06)
Adv-Elim
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Table 7 – Expected and realized game outcomes 
This table presents summary statistics of expected and realized game outcomes. In Panels A and B, 
Expected is the mean ex-ante probability of a particular outcome implied from bookmaker odds and by pre-
game betting exchange contracts, respectively. In-sample is the realized proportion of a particular outcome. 
In Panel C, Exchanges and Bookmakers correspond to the mean ex-ante probabilities as defined in Panels 
A and B, respectively. In Panels A and B, Diff. is the difference between Estimated and In-sample, whereas 
in Panel C is the difference between Exchanges and Bookmakers. In all panels, t-statistics for H0: Diff=0 
are reported in parentheses. N is the number of club-games in each subsample. 
 
Panel A – Bookmaker odds are obtained from Betexplorer (www.betexplorer.com), which compiles odds 
from various bookmakers and reports the best historical odds measure for each potential outcome. Odds are 
translated into probabilities of match outcomes, Probbookies,j, using the following transformation: 
lossdrawwin
win
winbookies OddsOddsOdds
OddsProb
/1/1/1
/1
, 
, 
where Probbookies,win is the ex-ante probability of a win implied by bookmakers’ odds, and Oddswin, Oddsdraw, 
and Oddsloss are the bookmakers’ odds of winning, tying, and losing, respectively. 
Expected In-sample Diff. Expected In-sample Diff. # obs
42.24% 42.10% 0.15% 31.60% 33.85% -2.24%
(57.72) (20.55) (0.07) (49.10) (17.24) (-1.09)
Home and 
away games
52.90% 54.83% -1.93% 22.37% 21.38% 0.99%
(61.24) (18.73) (-0.63) (35.97) (8.86) (0.40)
31.66% 29.45% 2.21% 40.77% 46.23% -5.46%
(40.09) (11.02) (0.79) (49.17) (15.82) (-1.80)
Favorites and 
underdogs
48.35% 51.25% -2.90% 26.08% 25.75% 0.33%
(60.26) (20.48) (-1.10) (42.20) (11.76) (0.14)
28.82% 21.98% 6.84% 43.75% 51.65% -7.90%
(29.85) (7.14) (2.12) (39.66) (13.90) (-2.04)
Advanced and 
early stages
37.80% 29.05% 8.75% 34.08% 37.84% -3.76%
(30.55) (7.76) (2.22) (29.12) (9.46) (-0.90)
43.76% 46.54% -2.79% 30.76% 32.49% -1.73%
(50.00) (19.42) (-1.09) (40.37) (14.44) (-0.73)
45.08% 42.22% 2.86% 30.10% 35.56% -5.46%
(16.34) (11.44) (0.62) (11.92) (9.94) (-1.25)
Panel A - Bookmaker odds probabilities
Deciding games 180
182
148
All games
Home games
Away games
Favorites
292
400
Underdogs
434
Wins Losses
582
290
Advanced stages
Early stages
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Panel B – Betting exchange prices of contracts on wins, losses, and draws are from Betfair 
(www.betfair.com) and Tradesports (www.tradesports.com). To obtain the ex-ante probability of a game’s 
outcome, first, we compute the volume-weighted average price of each type of contract matched prior to 
the start of the game (contracts that are “not in play”). We normalize prices using the sum of average prices 
on the three contracts. For example, the implied probability of a win, Probexchange,win, is computed as: 
lossdrawwin
win
winexchange PPP
P
Prob ,
, 
where Pwin, Pdraw, and Ploss are the average prices of win, draw, and loss contracts, respectively. 
Expected In-sample Diff. Expected In-sample Diff. # obs
43.90% 36.97% 6.93% 30.48% 38.39% -7.90%
(30.58) (11.10) (1.91) (23.61) (11.44) (-2.20)
Home and 
away games
55.16% 52.83% 2.33% 20.57% 20.75% -0.19%
(31.00) (10.84) (0.45) (15.71) (5.24) (-0.04)
32.53% 20.95% 11.58% 40.49% 56.19% -15.70%
(19.95) (5.25) (2.69) (23.00) (11.55) (-3.03)
Favorites and 
underdogs
52.00% 46.85% 5.14% 23.27% 28.67% -5.40%
(33.33) (11.19) (1.15) (18.50) (7.56) (-1.35)
26.87% 16.18% 10.70% 45.66% 58.82% -13.17%
(16.05) (3.60) (2.23) (22.57) (9.78) (-2.08)
Advanced and 
early stages
34.12% 13.16% 20.96% 38.25% 50.00% -11.75%
(13.53) (2.37) (3.44) (14.20) (6.08) (-1.36)
46.05% 42.20% 3.85% 28.78% 35.84% -7.06%
(28.46) (11.21) (0.94) (20.12) (9.80) (-1.80)
47.06% 45.00% 2.06% 28.60% 31.67% -3.07%
(16.60) (6.95) (0.29) (11.32) (5.23) (-0.47)
173
Deciding games 60
All games 211
Home games
Away games
106
105
Early stages
Favorites
Underdogs
Advanced stages
68
38
Wins Losses
Panel B - Betting exchange probabilities
143
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Panel C – This panel provides a direct comparison of match outcome ex-ante probabilities implied by 
betting exchange prices and bookmakers’ odds when both are available. 
 
Expected In-sample Diff. Expected In-sample Diff. # obs
43.51% 38.74% 4.77% 30.73% 35.24% -4.51%
(30.02) (31.48) (2.51) (23.43) (31.37) (-2.61)
Home and 
away games
54.66% 48.48% 6.18% 20.86% 26.48% -5.62%
(30.12) (32.60) (2.63) (15.48) (23.45) (-3.20)
32.24% 28.90% 3.35% 40.70% 44.09% -3.39%
(19.82) (20.61) (1.56) (22.90) (29.29) (-1.46)
Favorites and 
underdogs
51.89% 45.64% 6.24% 23.21% 28.94% -5.73%
(32.86) (34.22) (3.02) (18.29) (26.96) (-3.45)
26.87% 25.02% 1.85% 45.66% 47.74% -2.08%
(16.05) (16.34) (0.82) (22.57) (26.37) (-0.77)
Advanced and 
early stages
34.43% 32.43% 2.00% 37.92% 39.34% -1.42%
(13.39) (14.53) (0.59) (13.81) (17.23) (-0.40)
45.53% 40.14% 5.39% 29.13% 34.32% -5.20%
(27.77) (28.68) (2.50) (19.98) (27.07) (-2.69)
46.37% 43.86% 2.51% 28.96% 31.58% -2.62%
(16.31) (6.61) (0.35) (11.24) (5.08) (-0.39)Deciding games 57
203
Panel C - Bookmaker odds-based probabilities vs. betting exchange probabilities
Wins Losses
166
All games
Home games
Away games
Favorites
Underdogs
Advanced stages
135
Early stages
102
68
37
101
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Table 8 – Relation between expected and realized match outcomes 
This table presents ordered logit estimates for the relation between game outcomes, ex-ante probabilities 
implied by betting exchange prices or bookmakers’ odds, and game characteristics. The ordered logistic 
model estimated is: 
 






j
jjdrawprobdrawwinprobwinresult IprobprobresultYprob
resultYprob 
)(1
)(ln , 
 
where Y=1 for wins, Y=2 for draws, and Y=3 for losses, result takes on values 1 or 2, probwin (probdraw) is 
the ex-ante probability of a win (draw) implied by betting exchange prices or bookmakers’ odds as defined 
in Table 7, Ij are zero-mean indicator variables for home/away games, favorite/underdog status, and stage 
of the competition, similar to Table 5. P-values of the coefficient estimates’ χ2 under H0: Coefficient=0 are 
reported in parentheses. N is the number of unique games. Panel A presents results for the samples of 
games with available betting exchange and bookmaker data separately. Panel B presents the results for the 
unified sample with both betting exchange and bookmaker data available. 
3.296 2.736 1.482 1.009
(0.005) (0.025) (0.046) (0.009)
4.671 4.145 2.696 2.238
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.009)
-6.748 -5.558 -5.554 -4.441
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-3.713 -3.520 0.216 0.206
(0.255) (0.291) (0.922) (0.928)
-0.649 -0.283
(0.078) (0.236)
-0.104 -0.378
(0.816) (0.122)
0.381 0.194
(0.329) (0.337)
# obs 582 582 211 211
Home
Favorite
Panel A: All games
Intercept 1
Intercept 2
Betting 
exchange probabilities
Bookmaker 
odds-based probabilities
Advanced stage 
Prob (win)
Prob (draw)
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3.205 2.621 1.393 0.830
(0.007) (0.037) (0.314) (0.152)
4.596 4.049 2.746 2.233
(0.000) (0.001) (0.048) (0.152)
-6.658 -5.491 -6.661 -4.990
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
-3.563 -3.303 2.177 1.788
(0.286) (0.336) (0.628) (0.711)
-0.614 -0.413
(0.097) (0.158)
-0.092 -0.259
(0.838) (0.556)
0.317 0.342
(0.425) (0.401)
# obs 203 203 203 203
Panel B: Restricted sample
Betting 
exchange probabilities
Bookmaker 
odds-based probabilities
Intercept 1
Intercept 2
Prob (win)
Prob (draw)
Home
Favorite
Advanced stage 
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Table 9 – Relation between (pre-match) expected outcome and realized (post-match) return 
This table reports unrestricted and semi-unrestricted OLS estimates of the relation between returns of 
publicly traded clubs following Champions League and UEFA Cup games and the ex-ante probabilities 
implied by betting exchange prices or bookmakers’ odds. The unrestricted model is as follows:: 
 
.)( ,0,, iiidrawidrawiwinprobwiniWi RprobDprobWR    
The associated set of restrictions that we test are:  
.0  ;    probwinW  
The semi-restricted model is as follows:: 
 
.)()( ,0,, iiidrawidrawiwiniwini RprobDprobWR    
The associated restriction is .0  Ri is the club post-game abnormal return as defined in Table 4, Win 
(Draw) is an indicator variable for wins (draws), and probwin (probdraw) is the ex-ante probability of a win 
(draw) implied by betting exchange prices or bookmakers’ odds as defined in Table 7. In the columns 
labeled Unrestricted model, Wald statistic and p-value provide the corresponding test statistics under H0: 
All coefficient restrictions hold. N is the number of club-games. 
 
Unrestricted model Semi-restricted model Unrestricted model Semi-restricted model
-0.02% -0.16% -0.50% -0.83%
(-0.05) (-1.06) (-1.58) -6.76
2.49% 2.98%
(5.36) (9.50)
-3.25% -3.78%
(-3.31) (-4.81)
2.45% 2.95%
(5.31) 9.43
1.13% 1.06% 1.69% 1.67%
(2.31) (2.20) (5.09) 5.04
-7.19% -8.23% -13.30% -13.88%
(-0.62) (-0.72) (-2.94) 3.08
R squared 15.81% 15.36% 14.80% 14.60%
# obs 211 211 582 582
Wald statistic 2.54 23.54
p value (0.082) (0.000)
Panel A: All games
Intercept
Win
Betting exchange probabilities Bookmaker odds-based probabilities
Prob(win)
Win - Prob(win)
Draw - Prob(draw)
Day-0 abnormal return
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Unrestricted model Semi-restricted model Unrestricted model Semi-restricted model
-0.07% -0.12% -0.19% -0.48%
(-0.16) (-0.82) (-0.43) -2.66
2.51% 2.43%
(5.29) (5.11)
-3.08% -3.19%
(-3.06) (-2.71)
2.48% 2.39%
(5.26) 5.06
1.08% 1.03% 1.06% 0.99%
(2.17) (2.10) (2.11) 2.01
-8.76% -9.41% -9.08% -9.71%
(-0.75) (-0.81) (-0.77) -0.83
R squared 16.24% 15.99% 15.27% 1495.00%
# obs 203 203 203 203
Wald statistic 1.87 3.81
p value (0.158) (0.024)
Panel B: Restricted Sample
Intercept
Win
Betting exchange probabilities Bookmaker odds-based probabilities
Prob(win)
Win - Prob(win)
Draw - Prob(draw)
Day-0 abnormal return
 
 
 
 
 
